The Inconvenient Forum and Internationl Comity in Private Antitrust Actions by Kresic, Mladen Don
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 52 Issue 3 Article 5 
1983 
The Inconvenient Forum and Internationl Comity in Private 
Antitrust Actions 
Mladen Don Kresic 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mladen Don Kresic, The Inconvenient Forum and Internationl Comity in Private Antitrust Actions, 52 
Fordham L. Rev. 399 (1983). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol52/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE INCONVENIENT FORUM AND INTERNATIONAL
COMITY IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 1983, a British court enjoined the plaintiff in an
American antitrust action from proceeding with the suit.' The Ameri-
can court responded by issuing an injunction preventing the defend-
ants "from seeking shelter from United States law in a British court."2
On December 7, 1983, the Department of Justice announced that it
was ending a six-year investigation of four American oil companies
operating in Saudi Arabia.3 Assistant Attorney General William F.
Baxter stated that the investigation did not justify "the almost inevita-
ble foreign political costs." '4 In the last quarter of 1979, five foreign
governments filed amicus briefs urging an American court not to
exercise antitrust jurisdiction over firms incorporated in their nations.5
Their arguments were rejected.6
These situations are recent examples of the tension created by the
application of American antitrust laws7 to conduct occurring outside
1. Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 & n.12
(D.D.C. 1983).
2. Id. at 1139.
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
4. Id. at D6, col. 4.
5. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980) (Austra-
lia, Canada, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, South Africa).
6. Id. at 1256.
7. The principal statute applying to international trade is the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). The jurisdictional reach of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982), is similar in scope to that of the Sherman Act. The
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982), however, have a much narrower scope and rarely
apply to conduct outside the United States. See B. Hawk, United States, Common
Market and International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide 52-56 (1979).
Former Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield recently articulated the prob-
lem as jurisdictional on one hand and involving controversies of "conflicting eco-
nomic regimes" reflected in varied antitrust enforcement schemes on the other. See
Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 354 (1983). Many governments subscribe either "to a
'nationality' principle of jurisdiction, asserting a primary right to regulate conduct of
their nationals," or to a territorial principle, asserting the right to regulate conduct
within their territories. Id. at 362. Less common are the universality principle, based
on a nation's custody over the defendant, and the protective principle, based on
criminal threats to state security. See B. Hawk, supra, at 31. This is in sharp contrast
to expansive United States notions of jurisdiction.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)
(emphasis added). Although in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
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the United States. 8 In today's integrated world economy, the Ameri-
can interest in protecting its free-market system increasingly conflicts
with the interests of foreign governments that deplore such "legal
imperialism." 9 Although bilateral or international treaties, such as the
one recently concluded between the United States and Australia,10 are
preferable to judicial attempts to resolve these controversies,1 diplo-
matic agreements cannot prevent all such disputes from reaching the
courts.12
347 (1909), the Supreme Court proscribed extraterritorial extension of the Act,
subsequent cases eroded this ruling, see, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268 (1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pacific &
A. Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913), so that by 1945 application of antitrust
laws to extraterritorial conduct had become accepted. See B. Hawk, supra, at 22-26.
In 1945, Judge Learned Hand articulated the "intent and effects" jurisdictional test
in holding that the Sherman Act can be applied extraterritorially. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). "[A]ny state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
borders . . . which the state reprehends. ... Id. See infra note 16.
8. For a general discussion of the tensions caused by extraterritorial extension of
United States antitrust laws, see Shenefield, supra note 7.
9. Atwood, International Antitrust Issues in the Courts and the Congress, 50
Antitrust L.J. 257, 258 (1981); see Shenefield, supra note 7, at 354 ("economic
imperialism").
10. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982,
United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprinted in 21 Int'l Legal Materials
702 (1982). Articles 1 through 4 provide for notification and consultation regarding
action taken by either government that may conflict with the laws of the other. Id. at
703-07. Article 5 provides for cooperation in antitrust enforcement when the other
government's laws are not implicated. Id. at 708. Lastly, Article 6 provides for
United States Government participation in any private antitrust action, upon the
request of the Australian Government, when the suit relates to conduct advancing a
policy of the Australian Government. Id.
11. See B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 812-14; C. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce
Section: Antitrust Division, Remarks Before the World Trade Institute Seminar on
Advanced International Antitrust Practices and Related Trade Issues (Dep't of Justice
Press Release May 12, 1983). The Department of Justice enthusiastically supports
such diplomatic efforts. Id. at 10-15. Diplomatic efforts are preferable for at least
two reasons. First, they help diffuse the "confrontational atmosphere," id. at 10, that
usually results from unlimited antitrust enforcement. Second, foreign affairs are the
province of the executive branch of government, which is better able to consider the
effects of these suits on relations with other nations and to decide whether the costs to
the American economy are outweighed by the strain placed on foreign relations. The
Supreme Court has recognized that, in the field of foreign affairs, court action may
impede American foreign policy and therefore, the courts should not interfere. See
Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The
President [is] the Nation's organ for foreign affairs. ... ); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("The President [is] the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations ....").
12. See Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing
Need For Reassessment, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 201, 211-12 (1982).
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The judiciary is thus presented with two problems. First, the extent
to which American courts have subject matter jurisdiction in suits
involving anticompetitive conduct that occurs outside the United
States is unclear. 13 Second, courts and commentators disagree on
whether judicial discretion should be exercised in either denying juris-
diction14 or dismissing a suit after jurisdiction has been established.'-
Although the traditional "intent and effects" jurisdictional test seemed
to limit the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws, 6
the use of this test is the focus of criticism because it inevitably results
in overbroad exercise of jurisdiction. 7 As a result, circuit courts have
13. This has been discussed in commentaries, see B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 31;
Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 18 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 199, 208-09 (1977), and demonstrated in
the varying tests applied by the courts. See National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card
Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1981) (court found effect on commerce but not on
competition and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-56 (7th Cir. 1980) (court used intent and effects
test to find jurisdiction, refusing to apply comity analysis); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292, 1294-99 (3d Cir. 1979) (court found juris-
diction using Alcoa's intent and effects test, but vacated and remanded for consider-
ation of comity factors); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,775, at 67,199-200, 67,204-06 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (court disrhissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, using comity analysis as part of the jurisdictional test).
14. See infra notes 110-111, 113 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 110-111, 113 and accompanying text.
16. This test, as first articulated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), seemed to limit jurisdiction. "[T]he [Sherman] Act does not
cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its
performance is shown actually to have had some effect upon them." Id. at 444. The
test was widely accepted. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 114 & n.8 (1969); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288
(1952); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979).
In Alcoa, the Supreme Court lacked the statutory quorum of six justices, ch. 231, §
215, 36 Stat. 1152 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)), to hear the case. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 320 U.S. 708 (1943). The Court therefore certified
the case to be heard by the three most senior judges of the circuit from which the case
arose, in this case the Second Circuit. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322
U.S. 716 (1944); see 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1976). Thus, Alcoa has the authority of
Supreme Court precedent. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 811-14 (1946).
17. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610-12 (9th Cir.
1976); B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 32-34; Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterri-
torial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate
Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 Va. J. Int'l L. 395, 404-05 (1983).
The intent part of the test, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
443-44 (2d Cir. 1945), also fails to limit the extraterritorial extension of the antitrust
laws, because courts have found that an intended effect on almost any product
market affects the American portion of that market. See United States v. Alkali
Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (participation in international
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devised a new jurisdictional test, adding a "comity" prong to jurisdic-
tional analysis.' 8 This approach, first adopted in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, 9 requires a court to balance certain interests
of the United States against the corresponding interests of other na-
tions20 to determine whether the suit should be dismissed. 21
cartel equated with intent to restrain trade in the United States); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (intent to divide up world
market translated to intent to block competition of foreign companies in the United
States); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Toler-
ances in Interstate and International Law, 65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1150 (1956); cf.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (intent requirement "may be satisfied by the rule that a person is presumed to
intend the natural consequences of his actions") (quoting W. Fugate, Foreign Com-
merce and the Antitrust Laws 48 (2d ed. 1973)). Once an effect on American
commerce has been detected, there is no other jurisdictional limit to the applicability
of American antitrust law. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 609-10 & n. 14 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing broad scope of jurisdiction under the
Alcoa test). Sherman Act jurisdiction has almost always been found when the Alcoa
test has been applied. B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 37.
18. See Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.,
549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976); National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n,
507 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981). In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979),
the court accepted the comity approach as a post-jurisdictional analysis and not as
part of the jurisdictional test. Id. at 1294-98.
19. 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976).
20. Id. The test according to Timberlane should begin with the Alcoa "intent and
effects" analysis. Id. at 613, 615. A private plaintiff must then show that he is within
the sector of the economy that is targeted by the conspiracy or which will be affected
by the defendant's conduct. Id. at 613. This part of the analysis is known as the
"target area" test. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 885-86
(5th Cir. 1982) (to have standing plaintiff must be within that part of the economy
which is targeted by defendant's conduct), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244
(1983); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1975) (consumers
have no standing when manufacturers of telecommunications equipment are targets
of the conspiracy). This part of the analysis seems to combine substantive and
jurisdictional issues, which causes some confusion. B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 43. On
remand of Timberlane, however, the Northern District of California used this prong
as a "target area" standing analysis. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,775, at 67,202-03 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Finally, the "comity"
prong of the test determines whether the court should exercise jurisdiction over the
action. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-615. The factors to be weighed under this prong
are:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or alle-
giance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be ex-
pected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is
explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of
such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
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549 F.2d at 614. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d
Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit used a somewhat different list. The court added
availability of remedy and possible effect on foreign relations as considerations in
assessing comity. Id. at 1297-98.
A similar "jurisdictional rule of reason" was proposed as early as 1958. See K.
Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad 446 (1958). It has been adopted
by the Restatement, see Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 40 (1965); Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981), and by the Antitrust Division. Dep't of
Justice Antitrust Guide for International Operations 6-7 (1977); see C. Stark, Chief,
Foreign Commerce Section: Antitrust Division, Remarks Before the Annual Confer-
ence of the Canadian Council on International Law 3-4 (Dep't of Justice Press
Release October 21, 1983). Some courts, however, have not accepted the Timberlane
balancing approach. See National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6,
8 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (7th Cir.
1980).
21. Once it has been determined that a court has jurisdiction, regardless of the
analysis used, the act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines are defenses which
may provide a limitation on the extraterritorial reach of American law.
The classic formulation of the act of state doctrine is found in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S 398, 439 (1964); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d
300, 302 (3d Cir. 1982); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
The defense of foreign compulsion requires that the alleged acts of a private
defendant be done under compulsion of foreign law and not merely with the ap-
proval of a foreign government. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d
300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606
(9th Cir. 1976); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).
The applicability of the act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines in private
antitrust actions, however, is limited partially because the goal behind these doc-
trines is to protect the conduct of foreign affairs by the political branches from
interference by the judiciary. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
423 (1964). "[T]he less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign
relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches." Id. at
428. The greatest limitation is inherent in the narrow factual situations that can give
rise to the defenses. See McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign
Payments by Corporations: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 Fordham L.
Rev. 1071, 1104-09 (1978). The act of state doctrine, for example, was rejected in
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 605-08, and other recent cases that presented foreign
relations problems. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
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The comity approach, however, has two serious shortcomings: the
absence of a requirement of an alternative forum in which the plain-
tiff may seek redress22 and the failure to give adequate consideration
to litigants' interests.2 3 Moreover, this analysis, which balances comity
factors to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, has no
firm basis in legislation or congressional intent.24 Under this analysis,
the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts can vary in
cases in which the alleged conduct is identical.2 5 A more principled
and sound approach can be found in the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.26
Unfortunately, in 1948 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens was not available in antitrust cases. 27 The
decision was overturned on other grounds2 8 but its reasoning has never
been attacked and, until recently, the defense of forum non conve-
niens has rarely been raised in antitrust actions.2 9
425 U.S. 682 (1976); United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d
48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980). At least one court, however,
has interpreted the scope of the act of state doctrine broadly enough to consider many
factors otherwise present in the Timberlane comity analysis. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
22. See Grippando, supra note 17, at 421, 422. The adequacy of an alternative
forum is just one factor in the comity analysis and not a prerequisite. See Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979).
23. See infra notes 121, 129-31 and accompanying text.
24. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act:
Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 130,
149-50 (1982). But cf. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) (favorable
reference to Timberlane). See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
25. The Timberlane court recognized that conflicting government policies may
be factors in deciding whether to accept jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 614. Thus, the
alleged conduct of the defendant is not dispositive of the jurisdictional question. The
same conduct may therefore be the basis of jurisdiction in some cases but not in
others.
26. Forum non conveniens "deals with the discretionary power of a court to
decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it
may be more appropriately tried elsewhere." Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum L. Rev. 1, 1 (1929). This doctrine is
often applied in an international context, in particular to mass tort causes of action
such as airplane crashes, see, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981);
Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1983); Friends for All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 717 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and maritime accidents,
see, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Needham v. Phillips Petroleum
Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1983); Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co.,
648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
27. United States v. National City Lines (National 1), 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
28. United States v. National City Lines (National 11), 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
29. See Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111, 113-14 (3d Cir.) (forum
non conveniens may be applicable to antitrust), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951);
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. National Mines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 67, 71-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (forum non conveniens motion to dismiss denied on the merits); El
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Recent discussion of forum non conveniens in antitrust cases3 ° and
dissatisfaction with the Timberlane analysis31 both suggest a need to
re-examine the use of common-law forum non conveniens in antitrust.
This Note asserts that forum non conveniens is a possible, albeit not
all-encompassing, solution to the controversies created by expansive
American notions of jurisdiction, and that it may complement other
defenses commonly applied in international antitrust actions. 32 The
doctrine may also provide an opportunity for the courts to avoid the
problems33 posed by the application of the Timberlane comity analy-
sis. 34 This Note concludes that forum non conveniens is the most
equitable way to assess both public policy and litigants' interests while
addressing the concerns of foreign nations.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE AND
ITS HISTORICAL TREATMENT IN ANTITRUST LAW
Forum non conveniens is a discretionary doctrine that allows a
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction when it appears more appro-
priate to try the case elsewhere.3 5 The doctrine allows courts to ease
the rigidity of jurisdictional rules that may impose unnecessary bur-
dens on the litigants or the judicial resources of the community in
which the action is brought. 36 In 1948 the exercise of the doctrine was
precluded in antitrust cases, 37 and despite subsequent developments in
the law that permit its use, 38 forum non conveniens has seldom been
applied.3 9
Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 444 F. Supp. 845, 846 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(motion denied as frivolous for lack of adequate alternative forum in Bolivia);
Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 668
(D.N.H. 1977) (same).
30. Two recent antitrust cases have rekindled the controversy. See Industrial Inv.
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds,
103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811
(D.D.C. 1983).
31. See Kadish, supra note 24, at 147-49; see also Grippando, supra note 17
(criticism of comity approach).
32. See supra note 21.
33. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. Blair, supra note 26, at 1. Forum non conveniens is a post-jurisdictional
doctrine. "Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is
absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
504 (1947).
36. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (protecting rights of
litigants); Blair, supra note 26, at 25 (forum non conveniens is a means to protect the
citizens of the forum state from burdens imposed upon them by imported actions).
37. United States v. National City Lines (National 1), 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
38. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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A. Forum Non Conveniens in the Federal Court System
In the federal court system the equitable doctrine4 of forum non
conveniens41 was first applied in admiralty cases. 42 Courts were con-
40. For many years, discretion to decline jurisdiction was exercised only in equity
and was limited to admiralty suits and stockholder derivative actions. See O'Brien v.
Miller, 168 U.S. 287, 297 (1897) ("courts of admiralty ... act upon enlarged
principles of equity"); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev.
908, 925 (1947). This was due, in great part, to dictum contained in Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 82, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), in which Chief Justice Marshall stated
that the courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given." Id. at 100, 6 Wheat. at 404. By the
1930's, however, federal courts began to extend forum non conveniens beyond these
limits, thereby dismissing actions at law as well as in equity. See Canada Malting Co.
v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932) ("[C]ourts of equity and of law also
occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit
is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litigation can
more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal."); Langnes v. Green, 282
U.S. 531, 544 (1931) (proposing discretionary jurisdiction in tort actions brought by
foreigners); Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1931)
(damage action for cash surrender value of insurance policy). In 1938, with the
merger of law and equity by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the procedural distinction between the two disappeared. Braucher, supra, at 925.
41. Although it has been argued that forum non conveniens is indigenous to some
American state courts, it is generally agreed that the doctrine originated in Scotland
sometime during the nineteenth century. Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380, 386-87 (1947); Blair, supra note 26, at 20-22;
Braucher, supra note 40, at 909-10, 912. Originally, the Scottish plea of forum non
competens was directed at lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brown's Trustees v. Palmer,
9 S. 224 (1830); Vernor v. Elvies, 6 Dict. of Dec. 4788 (1610); Barrett, supra, at 387
n.35; Braucher, supra note 40, at 909. Later it was applied when the court either
lacked jurisdiction or recognized it would be inequitable to exercise jurisdiction due
to inconvenience and inefficient administration of justice. See, e.g., Clements v.
Macaulay, 4 M. 583 (1866); Parker v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co., 8 D. 365 (1846);
Barrett, supra, at 387 n.35. In time, the Scottish courts distinguished the two and
developed a separate doctrine of forum non conveniens to deal with post-jurisdic-
tional discretionary dismissals based on convenience and justice. See Brown v. Cart-
wright, 20 Scot. L.R. 818 (1883); Societe du Gaz de Paris v. Societe Anonyme du
Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," 1925 Sess. Cas. 332, afj'd, 1926 Sess. Cas.
(H.L.) 13.
In the English courts, the doctrine was espoused in Logan v. Bank of Scot., [1906]
1 K.B. 141 (C.A. 1905), a stockholder action brought in an English court by a
Scottish plaintiff against a Scottish defendant. The court found that it should inter-
fere "whenever there is such vexation and oppression that the defendant ... would
be subjected to such injustice that he ought not to be sued in the Court in which the
action is brought, to which injustice he would not be subjected if the action were
brought in another accessible and competent Court." Id. at 150. Some of the factors
that were used to determine vexation are: difficulties in procuring witnesses and
documents from out of the country, the application of foreign law by the tribunal,
and the place of residence of the litigants. Id. at 152. These factors are very similar to
the private litigants' considerations in the modern forum non conveniens doctrine in
the United States. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1946). The fact
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cerned, as they are today,43 that "imported controversies" would un-
fairly burden the community in which the action was brought. 44 The
Supreme Court crystallized 45 the modern doctrine of forum non con-
veniens in 1947 in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.4 The Court stated that
that there had to be another accessible court before dismissal could be granted points
to the modern requirement of an alternative forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
The first formal recognition of forum non conveniens in the United States was in
Paxton Blair's landmark article in 1929. Blair, supra note 26. Blair recognized that
the individual states had been applying the doctrine for some time without fully
articulating it. Id. at 21-22. Some American courts recognized the doctrine indepen-
dently, "without benefit of the Latin phrase." Barrett, supra, at 387; see, e.g., Great
W. Ry. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305, 307 (1869); Johnson v. Dalton, 13 Am. Dec. 564, 565
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823); Gardner v. Thomas, 7 Am. Dec. 445, 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1817). The dismissals were generally in favor of forums of other states, and thejustifications were rooted in policy and not legal doctrine. Id. at 22. Because courts
did not articulate the doctrine, judicial guidelines for the exercise of such discretion
were never set. The courts dismissed suits in favor of other forums in an ad hoc
fashion by considering such factors as unavailability of witnesses, Great W. Ry. v.
Miller, 19 Mich. 305, 315 (1869), and the protection of citizens from burdens im-
posed upon them by imported controversies, causing increased administrative ex-
pense and delays in justice through court congestion. See Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54
Barb. 31, 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Pietraroia v. New Jersey & H.R. Ry. & Ferry Co.,
197 N.Y. 434, 439, 91 N.E. 120, 122 (1910). These are similar to some private and
public interest factors recognized by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
42. Braucher, supra note 40, at 919, 920-21; see Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932); In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488 (1890).
As early as 1804, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized that a
district court may use its discretion to refuse to hear admiralty disputes between
aliens, even when it possesses jurisdiction. Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. 239,
263, 2 Cranch 240, 264 (1804).
43. Compare Johnson v. Dalton, 13 Am. Dec. 564, 565 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823)
("[O]ur courts may take cognizance of torts committed on the high seas... where
both parties are foreigners; but on principles of comity . . . they have exercised a
sound discretion in entertaining jurisdiction or not, according to circumstances.")
with Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1981) (forum non conveniens
dismissal when plaintiff's residence and accident giving rise to cause of action were
both outside the United States) and Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 225 (1st Cir.
1983) (same) and Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (forum non conviens dismissal when accident occured outside the United
States, and ownership and maintenance of the instrumentality were both outside the
United States), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
44. Blair, supra note 26, at 25. Courts believed it was improper to defer business
of American citizens due to "litigations between parties owing no allegiance to
[American] laws." One Hundred and Ninety-Four Shawls, 18 F. Cas. 703, 705
(S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 10,521). This type of consideration is reflected in the public
interest factors of the modern forum non conveniens doctrine. See infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
45. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248-49 (1981).
46. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The Court recognized that the doctrine allows a district
court to "resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized."
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an alternative forum must be available before the doctrine may be
applied and that this requirement is satisfied when the defendant is
amenable to process in the alternative forum. 47 It also enumerated the
private and public considerations to be weighed in the analysis. 48
Private considerations include the ease of access to evidence, the
availability of compulsory process over witnesses and the cost of ob-
taining their attendance, the possibility of viewing the scene where
the cause of action arose, and any other factors that may make the
trial "easy, expeditious and inexpensive. '49 Public considerations, on
the other hand, require balancing the interests of the community
where the action is brought 0 against the corresponding interests of the
community of the proposed alternative forum.5'
Id. at 507. The case involved a Virginia plaintiff who sued a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion in New York on a tort cause of action that accrued in Virginia. Id. at 502-03.
The Court affirmed the dismissal in favor of a Virginia forum. Id. at 512.
47. Id. at 506-07.
48. Id. at 508-09.
49. Id. at 508. The private interest analysis is used, in part, to determine whether
the plaintiff's choice of forum is necessary for his own convenience or whether that
choice is made just to vex and harass the defendant into an early settlement. Id. at
507-08; Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947).
These general considerations are instrumental in creating the flexibility necessary
for effective exercise of judicial discretion. "Each case turns on its facts." Williams v.
Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 557 (1946). The consideration of any "practical
problems that make trial . . . easy, expeditious and inexpensive," Gilbert, 330 U.S.
at 508, makes the doctrine flexible because no single factor is dispositive. See Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981). Since Piper, courts have consid-
ered a variety of factors. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 226 (1st Cir.
1983) (availability of witnesses and evidence, nationality of the victims, judicial
familiarity with applicable law); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 717 F.2d 602, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ease of access to sources of proof and
witnesses, availability of scientific evidence concerning the accident, protection
against court overcrowding, and discouragement of suits having no connection with
the community).
50. Communities that have no relation to the litigation should not bear the
judicial burdens. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
51. See id. Localized disputes should be adjudicated in the home forum. Id.; see
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 717 F.2d 602, 606, 608-09
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Furthermore, "[iln cases which touch the affairs of many persons,
there is reason for holding the trial in their view." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509. Adminis-
trative problems and congestion of the courts in the forum where the action is
brought and the connection of that community with the action are both crucial in
this balancing process. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09; see Pain v. United Technologies
Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
An additional consideration recognized by Gilbert is the court's familiarity with
the law that should be applied to the case. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509. This is not,
however, a factor in an extraterritorial case.
If the possibility of a change in law were given substantial weight, deciding
motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens would become
quite difficult. Choice-of-law analysis would become extremely important,
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Weighing most heavily against dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds is the interest of the plaintiff in having the action adjudicated
in the forum of his choice.52 The deference given plaintiffs choice of
forum, however, is diminished when that plaintiff is a foreign resi-
dent: Convenience should not be presumed when the suit is not
brought in the plaintiff's home forum. 53
The scope of the common-law forum non conveniens doctrine has
been narrowed in federal district courts, where transfer of venue 54 has
replaced forum non conveniens dismissal.5 5 Common-law forum non
conveniens, however, is still applied when there is no court to which
the action can be transferred,56 as where the alternative forum is a
foreign tribunal.5 7
Recently, the Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the Gilbert deci-
sion in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 58 a case in which dismissal was in
favor of a foreign forum.5 The Court asserted that no single factor is
and the courts would frequently be required to interpret the law of foreign
jurisdictions.... The doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is de-
signed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in compar-
ative law.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981).
52. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. "[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Id.; see Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981); IA J. Moore, W. Taggart, A.
Vestal & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 0.204, at 2206 (2d ed. 1983). In
Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), the Court recog-
nized that special deference should be given to plaintiff's choice if that choice is his
home forum. Id. at 524.
53. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 & n.23 (1981).
54. The transfer-of-venue provision is a statutory version of the forum non conve-
niens doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976) (Reviser's Notes); see J. Moore, supra note
52, 0.204, at 2205; 35 Cornell L.Q. 459, 461 (1950).
55. J. Moore, supra note 52, 0.204, at 2208 ("[W]hen there is another federal
district court where the action might have been brought ... the power to dismiss on
the ground of forum non conveniens no longer exists."); see Gross v. Owen, 221 F.2d
94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Mars, Inc. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 386 F. Supp 1201,
1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fiorenza v. United States Steel Int'l, Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117,
120 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
56. J. Moore, supra note 52, 0.204, at 2208; C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts
§ 44, at 260 (4th ed. 1983); see Harrison v. Capivary, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1141, 1142
(E.D. Mo. 1971) (codification of forum non conveniens does not lessen a federal
court's authority to dismiss cases in favor of foreign forums).
57. J. Moore, supra note 52, 0.204, at 2208; C. Wright, supra note 56, § 44, at
260; see, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (dismissal in
favor of Scotland); Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1983) (dis-
missal in favor of Pakistan or Saudi Arabia); Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of
Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1484-85 (10th Cir. 1983) (dismissal in favor of Norway).
58. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
59. The dismissal was in favor of Scotland. Id. at 261. The accident took place in
Scotland, the victims were all Scottish subjects, and the airplane was owned, oper-
ated and maintained by Scottish corporations. Id. at 239, 260. Although the two
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dispositive ° of a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss. 6' To allow
such dismissal would limit the doctrine and reduce its value as a
flexible, discretionary tool.62 Furthermore, the Court reasserted the
rule that the requirement of an available alternative forum is satisfied
when the defendant is amenable to service in that forum.6 3 This
requirement is easily satisfied, however, when dismissal is conditioned
upon the defendant's waiver of personal jurisdiction objections in the
alternative forum .64
B. Forum Non Conveniens in Antitrust:
The National City Lines Decisions
In United States v. National City Lines (National 1),15 the Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was unavailable
in antitrust actions. 6 This decision followed a procedural revolution
regarding the doctrine and was shaped, in part, by language in Gil-
bert617 that impliedly limited the use of forum non conveniens to
actions in which venue was authorized under the general venue stat-
defendant corporations were American, the difficulty of impleading possible third
party defendants, id. at 259, and the location of evidence and witnesses in Scotland,
id. at 258-59, both pointed to Scotland as the more appropriate forum. Id. at 238-39,
258-60.
60. Id. at 249; see Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1980) (less
favorable foreign law dispositive of forum non conveniens motion), rev'd, 454 U.S.
235 (1981).
61. 454 U.S. at 249-50.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 254 n.22; see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
64. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 225 (1st Cir. 1983) (dismissal
on condition that defendant agree to appear in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia affirmed);
Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483-85 (10th Cir. 1983)
(dismissal conditioned upon defendant's waiver of statute of limitations defense in the
alternative forum); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d
190, 203-04 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 349 (1983) (dismissal conditioned upon
defendant's appearance in an English court); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156,
1160, 1166 (2d Cir. 1978) (dismissal conditioned upon defendant's consent to suit in
Switzerland); Patterson, Zochonis, Ltd. v. Compania United Arrows, 493 F. Supp.
626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissal conditioned upon defendant's submission to
Japanese jurisdiction); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 738 (M.D. Pa.
1979) (dismissal conditioned upon waiver of statute of limitations defenses in Scot-
land), rev'd, 630 F.2d 149 (1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
65. 334 U.S. 573 (1948). National I was an action against nine corporations
charged with violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to acquire
control of local transportation companies in various cities throughout the United
States. Id. at 575.
66. Id. at 588.
67. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
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ute. 68 More importantly, however, the Court placed great weight on
the congressional intent behind the specific antitrust venue provision
in the Clayton Act 9-to ensure the plaintiff a convenient forum 70 _
and thus prohibited discretionary dismissal. 71
The National I Court found additional support for its holding in
other considerations. It feared that forum non conveniens dismissal
would "lengthen litigation already overextended." 72 Additionally, the
Court reasoned that there is no better forum than the one chosen by
the plaintiff when the scope of the alleged violations is nationwide and
the defendants are widely scattered. 73
In 1949, Congress passed the transfer-of-venue statute,7 4 partially
in response to National I and other decisions limiting the use of forum
68. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07. This result was suggested by Baltimore &
O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941), in which the Court held that the specific
venue provision of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), ch. 149, § 6, 35
Stat. 66 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976)), granted venue as a
matter of privilege and therefore precluded dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds. 314 U.S. at 53-54. Section 1404(a), which provides for discretionary trans-
fer between federal district courts, was passed in response to this ruling. Ch. 646, 62
Stat. 937 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976)) (Reviser's Notes);
H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A132 (1947).
Furthermore, the distinction between special and general venue provisions has
been eliminated with respect to forum non conveniens. See Bickel, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens as Applied to the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35
Cornell L.Q. 12 (1950). "[T]he Court [in National II] held only that § 1404(a), which
in effect codifies the Gilbert and Koster cases, applies, special venue provisions to the
contrary notwithstanding." Id. at 18; see United States v. National City Lines, 337
U.S. 78, 80-84 (1949).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982) provides: "Any suit, action, or proceeding under the
antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district
whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business ...."
70. Congress wanted the plaintiff to be able to sue in his home forum, which was
usually where the cause of action arose. See United States v. National City Lines
(National 1), 334 U.S. 573, 583-84 & n.22 (1948); 51 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1914)
(statement of Rep. Cullop).
71. United States v. National City Lines (National 1), 334 U.S. 573, 581, 588
(1948). The issue before the Court was whether Congress intended to give plaintiffs
an absolute right to choose a forum. Id. at 578; see United States v. National City
Lines, 80 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 78 (1949); Note,
New Judicial Code and Forum Non Conveniens, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 500 (1949).
72. 334 U.S. at 589. "Antitrust suits.., are notoriously... drawn out.... To
inject into this overlengthened procedure what would amount to an additional
preliminary trial ... could not but add ... to the time essential for disposing of the
cases ..... Id. at 590.
73. Id. at 591.
74. Ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1976)).
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non conveniens. 75 Section 1404(a) of title 28 provides that: "For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought. 7 6 Pursuant to the new
section 1404(a), the district court on remand of National I granted
transfer77 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 78
II. THE AvAILABILITY OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN ANTITRUST
ACTIONS AFTER THE SECOND NATIONAL CITY LINES DECISION
The National I holding was dramatically narrowed by the second
United States v. National City Lines (National I1)79 decision, which
disposed of the case on purely statutory grounds. 80 Section 1404(a)
replaced common-law forum non conveniens in the federal district
courts81 and was applied to antitrust actions. 82 Thus, forum non con-
veniens was rarely raised in antitrust actions until two recent cases
revived the controversy. 83
A. The Applicability of National I in Cases In Which Venue Lies in
Another Federal Forum
The National II decision did not explicitly overturn National I with
respect to the applicability of common-law forum non conveniens in
antitrust actions, 84 but it put the viability of that decision in serious
75. In National Il the Court stated that "the reviser's notes to § 1404(a), although
citing [Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941)], make no reference
to . . . our previous decision in this litigation. . . . The notes cite the [Kepner]
decision 'as an example of the need of such a provision.' Obviously, an example is not
a complete catalogue. . . .Quite the contrary, . . . [a]lthough no explanation is
needed for the lack of Congressional reference to our former decision, simple chro-
nology may be consulted." 337 U.S. at 81-82 (1949); see ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937 (1948)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976)) (Reviser's Notes). See supra note
68.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
77. United States v. National City Lines, 80 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1948), af'd,
337 U.S. 78 (1949).
78. United States v. National City Lines (National 11), 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 84 ("We hold that § 1404(a) is applicable here.").
81. See supra notes 54-55.
82. See, e.g., United States v. National City Lines (National 11), 337 U.S. 78
(1949); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Mo.
1980); Petroleum Fin. Corp. v. Stone, 116 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
83. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F.
Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1983).
84. In Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983), the circuit court seemed to
recognize that National IH did not explicitly overturn National I, id. at 890 n.18, and
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doubt. In National I, the Court had decided that courts are not
endowed with the power to qualify plaintiff's forum selection. 85 In the
second National decision, the Supreme Court concluded that, in en-
acting section 1404(a), Congress intended to allow the federal courts
some discretion in qualifying plaintiffs' forum selection,88 at least
when another federal forum is available. 7 Thus, the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized that its own assesment of congressional intent in
National I was wrong, and that judicial discretion can be used to
override jurisdiction in cases brought under section 12 of the Clayton
Act.88
Moreover, an antitrust plaintiff may establish venue under the
general venue statutes, 9 as well as under the specific antitrust venue
provision. ° Federal actions of all types are brought under the general
venue provisions and are routinely dismissed on common-law forum
non conveniens grounds. 91 It would, therefore, be paradoxical if Con-
in light of the narrow holding in National 11, 337 U.S. 78, 84 (1949), this appears to
be a reasonable conclusion. The issue, however, as framed by the National I Court,
suggests a wider scope. "The issue here is whether the 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code (Title 28, United States Code) extends the doctrine of forum non conveniens to
antitrust suits." Id. at 79.
85. National 1, 334 U.S. at 588.
86. National 11, 337 U.S. at 80-84. The discretionary nature of the doctrine is
implicit in the text of the provision, which refers to transfer in the "interest of
justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
87. See J. Moore, supra note 52, 0.204, at 2206-07. See supra note 55.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982). The Mitsui court held that National I precluded the
exercise of judicial discretion in qualifying plaintiff's choice of forum. Industrial Inv.
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). The court failed to recognize that National H
undermined this holding by allowing courts to qualify plaintiffs' choice of forum. See
National II at 337 U.S. 80, 82-84.
89. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1392 (1976).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982); see Board of County Comm'rs v. Wilshire Oil Co.,
523 F.2d 125, 130 (10th Cir. 1975); Sportmart, Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp. 1254,
1257 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Albert Levine Assocs. v. Bertoni & Cotti S.p.A., 314 F. Supp.
169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
91. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). "The principle of forum non
conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even
when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." Id. at 507;
see, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634 n.30 (1964) (mass tort action);
Veba-Chemie A.G. v. M/V Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243, 1248-51 (5th Cir. 1983) (mari-
time action); American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d
408, 417 (5th Cir. 1983) (unfair competition and trademark infringement); Scherten-
leib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1160 (2d Cir. 1978) (abuse of process action).
The goal behind specific venue statutes is to insure that plaintiffs have a forum in
which to pursue a remedy, thereby filling gaps in the general venue statutes as
applied to particular situations. Thus, the two types of statutes are complementary,
and there is no logic in treating them differently. See Albert Levine Assoc. v. Bertoni
& Cotti S.p.A., 314 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "[T]he specific venue provisions
of the antitrust statutes were intended to facilitate the prosecution of these actions
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
gress intended that suit brought under the specific antitrust venue
provision not be dismissible on forum non conveniens grounds, while
the same suit could be dismissed if brought under the general venue
provision.
B. The Applicability of National I When Dismissal
Is in Favor of a Foreign Forum
In a 1982 decision, Industrial Investment Development Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co.,92 the Fifth Circuit held that forum non conveniens
dismissal in antitrust cases is precluded as a matter of law.9 3 The
Mitsui court also reasoned that forum non conveniens is inapplicable
in antitrust cases, even without the National I precedent, because an
antitrust suit is in the nature of a criminal action.9 4 In a more recent
case, Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways,95 the trial court
reached the merits of a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss,96 but
held that the plaintiff could not be relegated to a tribunal in a country
that did not provide a comparable cause of action.9 7 Therefore, the
Laker court indicated that it considered forum non conveniens viable
in antitrust actions.
Different readings of the Supreme Court's assessment of the con-
gressional intent behind section 12 of the Clayton Act may explain the
different approaches of the two lower courts."" The National I Court
and not to make unavailable the general venue provisions." Id. at 170; see United
States v. National City Lines (National 1), 334 U.S. 573, 581-82 (1948) (specific
venue provision of the Clayton Act); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49-
50 (1941) (specific venue provision of the Federal Employers Liability Act).
92. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244
(1983).
93. Id. at 890-91. The Mitsui court never reached the merits of the forum non
conveniens motion, ruling that "antitrust cases cannot be dismissed on the ground
that a foreign country is a more convenient forum." Id. The court relied on the
National I decision as binding precedent. Id. at 890.
94. Id. at 891. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
95. 568 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1983).
96. 568 F. Supp. at 816-17. The Laker court cited Mitsui favorably, but it did
not accept National I as precedent and did not preclude application of forum non
conveniens as a matter of law. The court acknowledged that "it has.., been held
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to antitrust actions," id. at
817, but refused to preclude the use of the doctrine, thereby implying that there may
be situations in which forum non conveniens is applicable to antitrust actions. This is
consistent with other cases. See supra note 29.
97. Id. at 818; see Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124,
1137 (D.D.C. 1983). This is really a reference to the threshold requirement of an
adequate alternative forum. The Laker court also stressed the overwhelming contacts
of the action with the United States. 568 F. Supp. at 814-17.
98. See United States v. National City Lines (National 1), 334 U.S. 573, 588, 596-
97 (1948). The Mitsui court seems to accept this reading of congressional intent as
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inferred a congressional intention to give plaintiffs the opportunity to
litigate antitrust actions in their home forum, usually the forum in
which the cause of action arose.99 This reasoning clearly does not
apply to foreign plaintiffs or to causes of action accruing outside the
United States.
Furthermore, two additional considerations that supported the Na-
tional POO holding are not compelling in cases involving the extraterri-
torial extension of American antitrust laws. The first, that antitrust
actions are already too lengthy and that forum non conveniens dis-
missals would delay the process even further,' 0 ' is not applicable in
such cases. If an inconvenient forum were to retain jurisdiction, the
unavailability of witnesses, documents, and process over witnesses102
(which are factors in the forum non conveniens analysis) would delay
the action even more than forum non conveniens dismissal. 0 3 The
problem is compounded when actions are brought in the United States
by foreign plaintiffs for the sole purpose of recovering greater dam-
ages than are available in a more appropriate foreign forum.104 The
Supreme Court has recognized that such cases should be dismissed
because they are a waste of American judicial resources. 0 5
The second consideration cited by the Court was the difficulty of
applying forum non conveniens in cases in which the violations
charged are nationwide in scope and effect and the defendants are
widely scattered throughout the country. 0 6 The Court feared that a
forum non conveniens dismissal would result in the issue being reliti-
gated in the second forum, resulting in additional delay. 07 Although
valid, whereas the Laker court probably recognized that this reading of congressional
intent was negated by the National I decision. See supra notes 84-88 and accompa-
nying text.
99. See supra note 70.
100. 334 U.S. at 589-92.
101. Id. at 589-90.
102. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-60 (1981).
103. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 258-59 (1981). This problem is
particularly acute when the American tribunal is faced with a foreign "blocking"
statute which prohibits production of information for purposes of discovery in an
American action. Hawk, supra note 12, at 237-38; see Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 1980, ch. 11 (British blocking statute), reprinted in [Jan.-June] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at F-1-2 (Apr. 10, 1980).
104. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 (1981); R. Casad, Juris-
diction in Civil Actions 5.06, at 5-48 (1983). Foreign governments are likely to
invoke the blocking statutes when the action is brought in the United States solely to
recover greater damages and "the challenged conduct takes place outside United
States territory." Hawk, supra note 12, at 208.
105. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 & n.18.




this reasoning was closely related to the specific facts of the National
case, it is also applicable to many antitrust actions against multiple
defendants, such as Laker. Courts, however, may grant forum non
conveniens motions to dismiss on the condition that such defenses be
waived in the alternative forum. 08
Thus, a proper reading of the National decisions indicates that the
exercise of forum non conveniens is permissible in antitrust actions in
which the alternative forum is in a foreign country. The most impor-
tant question, which should ultimately resolve the controversy, is
whether there is real utility in applying forum non conveniens in such
actions.
III. SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE USE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN
ANTITRUST: WHERE AND WHY SHOULD THE DOCTRINE BE APPLIED?
The application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in anti-
trust cases that cross national boundaries can resolve many of the
problems left unanswered by the jurisdictional comity analysis and
other approaches. Forum non conveniens not only considers the fac-
tors which are part of the comity analysis, but also has the benefit of
considering private interests in the litigation. Permitting application
of forum non conveniens would thus foster more orderly and equitable
prosecution of private antitrust suits.109 Additionally, recent legisla-
tion and Justice Department policy are both consistent with the appli-
cation of forum non conveniens.
A. The Advantages of Using Forum Non Conveniens
in Lieu of the Comity Approach
The Timberlane comity approach balances the interests of the
United States against the interests of other nations concerned with the
litigation." 0 It involves discretionary dismissal, on subject matter ju-
108. See supra note 64. Generally, this consists of conditional dismissal subject to
the defendant's agreement to suit in the alternative forum and to the waiver of
jurisdictional and statute of limitations objections. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Boeing Co.,
720 F.2d 224, 225 (1st Cir. 1983) (dismissal on condition that defendant agree to
appear in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia); Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719
F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983) (dismissal conditioned upon defendant's waiver of
statute of limitations defense in the alternative forum); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589
F.2d 1156, 1157 (2d Cir. 1978) (dismissal conditioned upon defendant's consent to
suit in Switzerland).
109. The applicability of forum non conveniens, however, is limited by the re-
quirement of an adequate alternative forum. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 506-07 (1947).
110. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir.
1976).
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risdiction grounds, of congressionally-authorized causes of action.'
This approach, which has been adopted by a number of courts, has
been severely criticized." 2 Federal courts should not use discretion in
jurisdictional questions;" 3 rather, jurisdiction should be determined
pursuant to congressional mandate."14
111. Grippando, supra note 17, at 400 (questioning the "legitimacy" of reliance on
comity to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Rahl, International Appli-
cation of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
336, 363 (1980) (questioning how a court may exercise such discretion absent congres-
sional approval); Lowenfeld, Book Review, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1976, 1979 (1982)
("any decision not to 'exercise jurisdiction' is in some way a matter of grace ... but
not one of law.").
There is some question whether the Timberlane comity test is jurisdictional at all.
See Kadish, supra note 24, at 145-47; Note, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.: A Further Step Toward a Complete Subject Matter Jurisdiction Test, 2 Nw. J.
Int'l L. & Bus. 241, 260 (1980). In In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th
Cir. 1980), the circuit court did not view the test as jurisdictional, but rather as one
of post-jurisdictional abstention. Id. at 1255. The majority in Mannington Mills took
a similar approach. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); see Grippando, supra note 17, at 408-10.
Other judges and authors, however, see the Timberlane approach as a threshold
jurisdictional question. Judge Adams, concurring in Mannington Mills, made this
clear in his criticism of the majority opinion, calling the Timberlane approach an
"expanded jurisdictional test." 595 F.2d at 1301-02 n.9 (Adams, J., concurring). In
Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1001 (1982), the Tenth Circuit explicitly relied on comity concerns in
declining to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 871. Former Associate Attorney General John
Shenefield sees the Timberlane three-part test as a substitute for the Alcoa jurisdic-
tional analysis. Shenefield, supra note 7, at 362-64. Recently, on remand of Tim-
berlane, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,775 (N.D. Cal. 1983), the district court
confirmed the view that the Timberlane comity approach is a jurisdictional analysis.
Id. at 67,199.
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division accepts the Timberlane comity
concerns as a necessity. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International
Operations 6-7 (1977). For the elements of this test, see supra note 20. The Division,
however, separates the comity considerations from the subject matter jurisdiction
analysis. Id.
112. See supra notes 22-25, 31 and accompanying text.
113. See Kadish, supra note 24, at 149. Judicial discontent with legislative acts
does not permit courts to reform the law, and there is certainly no authority by which
courts can restrict the language of the Sherman Act. Id. The Alcoa jurisdictional test
was based on the Court's interpretation of congressional intent. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
114. "The creation of a new basis of federal jurisdiction.., is a legislative act."
Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 107 (1945); see Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939) ("jurisdiction of the federal courts... is a grant of
authority to them by Congress"); Hoffman v. Lynch, 23 F.2d 518, 521-22 (N.D. Ga.
1928) (legislative grant of powers is not to be overridden); Good v. Krauss, 457 F.
Supp. 50, 51 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (federal courts have only the jurisdiction prescribed
to them by Congress pursuant to Article III of the Constitution); Vigil v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 1176, 1185 (D. Colo. 1968) (federal courts have no authority to
adjudicate a cause of action which is not within their congressionally authorized
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In response to criticism of this approach, some courts have applied
the comity analysis only after jurisdiction has been found.115 For
example, in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. ,116 the Third
Circuit, using the "intent and effects" test," 7 specifically recognized
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case." 8
The court then applied the comity approach to balance national
interests to determine "whether [extraterritorial] jurisdiction should
be exercised.""19
The most significant drawback to the two comity approaches is the
absence of a requirement of an adequate alternative forum. 20 Fur-
thermore, the comity analysis stresses national concerns and ignores
the litigants' interests.' 2 ' Forum non conveniens, however, encom-
passes the requirement of comity within the framework of existing
law.12 2 All factors used in balancing public or national interests in-
volved in an antitrust action under Timberlane can be adequately
weighed in a public interest analysis under forum non conveniens.
Timberlane factors, such as the degree of intent to affect American
power), aJf'd, 430 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970); J. Moore, supra note 52, 0.201, at
2018.
It may be argued that, although courts are applying their own jurisdictional
comity analysis, the results have been the same as those obtained by the Alcoa test.
See B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 20-22 (Supp. 1983). Although the results may be the
same as those obtained under the Alcoa test, which is rooted in congressional intent,
see supra note 113, this does not justify the use of a jurisdictional test that is not
rooted in congressional intent. Our system is one of law: It prides itself on the maxim
that the ends do not justify the means. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 480 (1966).
115. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1982);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d Cir. 1979);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1188-89
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Kadish, supra note 24, at 144-47. See supra note 111.
116. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
117. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
118. 595 F.2d at 1292.
119. Id. at 1294.
120. See supra note 22.
121. In Mannington Mills, considerations of availability of witnesses, evidence
and process are conspicuously absent from the comity balance. 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
This is also true in other cases that have applied the comity analysis. See Montreal
Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1001 (1982); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th
Cir. 1976).
122. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). Forum non conveniens is a traditional
discretionary tool. This is clear from its congressional recognition as the basis of
§ 1404(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) (Reviser's Notes); H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. A132 (1947). Blair has suggested that in some cases, the application
of forum non conveniens is the only way to satisfy requirements of comity. Blair,
supra note 26, at 6 n.34.
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commerce and the significance of the effects in the United States
relative to those elsewhere, 2 3 indicate the extent to which the United
States has an interest in the action. 124 The opportunity given to de-
fendants to present all national interest factors favoring dismissal
under the public interest consideration of forum non conveniens 2 5
should help reduce tensions caused by extraterritorial extension of the
antitrust laws.
The strong public interest in American antitrust enforcement 2 6
should also play a major role in the forum non conveniens analysis.
Thus, the interest that a foreign state has in the litigation must out-
weigh the effects that the alleged antitrust violations have in the
United States. For example, when the alleged conduct has a discern-
ible effect on American commerce, but not on competition, and the
alternative forum has a significant interest in the litigation, then
forum non conveniens analysis favors dismissal. 27 Similarly, if there is
an anticompetitive effect in the United States, but it is outweighed by
the effect in a foreign nation, then the suit may be dismissed in favor
of an action brought in the other forum. 28
Unlike the Timberlane comity approach, forum non conveniens
considers the litigants' interests. 29 Protection of private interests'3"
123. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976).
These are just two of the Timberlane factors. See supra note 20.
124. This is the crucial public interest concern under Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). Moreover, these factors point to the ease, expedience
and relative expense of trial, all of which are a private litigant's concerns. Id. at 508.
125. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
126. "The U.S. antitrust laws are the foundation of our broad national commit-
ment to competition based on efficiency .... U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide
for International Operations 2 (1977); see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 311-23 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
127. Cf. National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8-9 (2d Cir.
1981) (subject matter jurisdiction absent for lack of a connection between alleged
conduct and anticompetitive consequences in the United States).
128. For example, country X, whose major economic resource is sugar, has 25
sugar refineries that control approximately 70 % of the world market. There are two
refineries in the United States with about 95% of the American market, but only 1%
of the world market outside the United States. Twenty of X's refineries with 50 % of
the market form a cartel and set maximum prices at the price level of the American
producers in order to price out their competition in X. The anticompetitive effect in
X is potentially more severe and economically detrimental than the effect in the
United States, and therefore, X's enforcement measures should be given deference.
129. See supra note 20. Additionally, as in Timberlane, discussions about Ameri-
can antitrust policy are generally so heated that the interests of the parties are all but
forgotten.
130. These interests involve factors of convenience such as availability of process,
witnesses and evidence. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. On remand, the
Timberlane district court considered some private interest factors, but it did not
make the detailed inquiry required by forum non conveniens. See Timberlane Lum-
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ultimately effectuates the enforcement of United States antitrust laws
within our adversarial system of justice and thereby results in effective
adjudication of antitrust claims. 31 Moreover, in the forum non conve-
niens analysis, there is a threshold requirement of a finding of an
adequate alternative forum 132 before a court will consider a forum
non conveniens motion to dismiss. The forum non conveniens analysis
thus affords greater protection than the Timberlane approach to both
the plaintiff's interest and the American interest in enforcing the
antitrust laws.
B. Can There Be an Adequate Alternative Forum in Antitrust Cases?
Historically, the justification for enforcement of American antitrust
laws across national boundaries rested on the absence of international
mechanisms to ensure protection against anticompetitive behavior in
international business.133 This view, although outdated, 134 is the basis
of criticism directed at dismissals based on international comity:135
insufficient attention is paid' to the adequacy of a foreign forum to
which a plaintiff may have to resort after dismissal. 36
It is argued that no forum outside the United States can be adequate
in antitrust cases. 3 7 The reasons given to support this view are the
United States' primary national interest in enforcing its antitrust
her Co. v. Bank of Am., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,775, at 67,198-205 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
131. The private interests are integrally related to, and often derived from, the
tensions created by the extraterritorial extension of antitrust laws. By blocking dis-
covery or impeding the continuance of actions, foreign courts affect the private
interests to be considered in a forum non conveniens motion. See Laker Airways v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (D.D.C. 1983); Shenefield, supra
note 7, at 355 & n.23. See supra note 103. Effective and fair enforcement of United
States antitrust laws is difficult if not impossible under such circumstances. This
apparent advantage given to a defendant's motion to dismiss is partially offset by the
requirement of an adequate alternative forum.
132. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
133. Grippando, supra note 17, at 395 n.1; see Rahl, American Antitrust and
Foreign Operations: What is Covered, 8 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1, 9-11 (1974).
134. Hawk, supra note 12, at 207. See infra notes 150-51, 161-66 and accompany-
ing text.
135. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,, 671 F.2d 876, 890-91 (5th
Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Laker Airways v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817-18 (D.D.C. 1983).
136. Grippando, supra note 17, at 405-10.
137. Id. at 410; see Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876,
890-91 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
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laws"38 and the lack of an adequate remedy in foreign forums. 13 The
courts have called private plaintiffs "private attorneys general" 140 and
have referred to the Sherman Act as our "charter of economic lib-
erty."' 4 1 Antitrust actions are sometimes compared with criminal
prosecutions because of their deterrent purpose. 42 It is therefore con-
tended that antitrust actions have no place in foreign courts because
one nation cannot enforce the criminal laws of another. 143 This argu-
ment is flawed in two critical respects when used to defeat the appli-
cability of forum non conveniens in antitrust.
First, such an argument runs counter to the Supreme Court's assess-
ment of civil antitrust actions as purely civil in a procedural sense. 144
This was recognized in National 11, in which the Court held that
antitrust actions fall under the "any civil action" language of section
1404(a).145 Moreover, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
was formed in 1933 for the purpose of fostering and maintaining
economic competition in the United States, by the "criminal and civil
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws."'14  Thus, the "penal" ele-
138. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 2
(1977). See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
139. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890-91 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Grippando, supra note 17,
at 410-14.
140. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897, 911 (1983); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J.,
concurring); Industrial Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 891 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
141. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); United States v.
Azzarelli Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1979); Quality Mercury, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914
(1977); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
142. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Industrial Inv.
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
143. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 891 (5th Cir
1982), vacated on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983) (citing The Antelope, 23
U.S. 30, 53-54, 10 Wheat. 66, 123 (1825)).
144. United States v. National City Lines (National I1), 337 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1949);
Fiorenza v. United States Steel Int'l, Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
145. United States v. National City Lines (National 11), 337 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1949).
This does not imply that, substantively, the antitrust laws are not in the nature of a
criminal action. See supra notes 94, 143 and accompanying text. However, for
purposes of forum non conveniens application the relevant question is whether,
procedurally, the case is civil or criminal. See United States v. National City Lines
(National I1), 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
146. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division Manual 1-17 (1982).
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ment is furthered by government enforcement actions, to which fo-
rum non conveniens would not apply.' 47 With this in mind, it is
extremely unfair that the litigants' interests should be ignored in favor
of "larger policies." That is not to say that there can be no deterrent
effect in private enforcement, 14 but when the alleged offenses are
sufficiently detrimental to American economic interests, then Ameri-
can antitrust policies can be adequately protected by a government
action. 149
Furthermore, anticompetitive behavior is now more widely con-
demned. The recognition among industrial nations of the damage
caused by such conduct shows that the American interest is not unique
and is addressed concurrently by other developed nations. 150 There is
also a strong interest among developing countries in curbing the anti-
competitive conduct of large multinational corporations. 151 Thus,
147. The strong expression of the United States interest in the action, inherent in a
suit brought by the Department of Justice, should preclude forum non conveniens
dismissal. See Grippando, supra note 17, at 425.
148. It has been suggested, however, that private antitrust actions raising ques-
tions of extraterritorial application be statutorily prohibited. Snyder, Private Invest-
ment & Trade: Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Antitrust Law, 6 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 36-
37 (1965).
149. See Grippando, supra note 17, at 425. Legislation has "further emphasized
the compensatory purpose of private treble damage actions. The Federal Trade
Commission Act, for example, established a governmental agency to police anticom-
petitive behavior." Id. at 412; see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41
(1982).
150. This is particularly true for nations in the European Economic Community.
Hawk, supra note 12, at 207; see generally Unit B, World Law of Competition (J.
von Kalinowski gen. ed. 1979) (multivolume treatise dealing with anticompetition
laws throughout the world).
151. This is made evident by the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, adoption of a Restrictive Business Practices Code. UNCTAD, The Set
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive
Business Practices, U.N. Doe. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980), reprinted in 19 Interna-
tional Legal Materials 813 (1980). This code is designed to promote: "(a) The crea-
tion, encouragement and protection of competition; (b) Control of the concentration
of capital and/or economic power; (c) Encouragement of innovation." Id. at 815.
Adherence to the Code is voluntary, based on national and regional promulgation of
laws consistent with it. Id. at 819-20 (section E).
Certain developing nations have enacted antitrust legislation. For example, Brazil
has had an anticompetition provision in its constitution since 1946, see Unit C, World
Law of Competition, Bra 3-2 n.1 (J. von Kalinowski gen. ed. 1982), and it enacted
antitrust legislation in 1962. Id. at Bra 3-2. Although rarely applied at first, "more
recently, due to the recognition given worldwide.., antitrust legislation has begun
to take its rightful place in Brazilian law." Id. This law is aimed at prohibiting unfair
competition and monopolization. Id. at Bra 3-3. It also provides for stiff penalties to
be imposed on violators. Id. at Bra 3-38. Additionally, Argentina has recently
amended its laws to protect against anticompetitive conduct and monopolistic prac-
tices, id. at Arg 2-2 to 2-3, and to provide for criminal sanctions, id. at Arg 2-16 to 2-
17.
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there is greater potential that the antitrust policies recognized by the
United States can be furthered without the need for American courts
to act. 15
2
Commentators fear that unavailability of the treble damage rem-
edy 53 in foreign courts would diminish the deterrent effect of United
States antitrust laws. 154 If, however, the American interest in the
cessation of particular conduct is strong enough to require such a
deterrent force, the Department of Justice can express that national
interest by instituting criminal or civil proceedings of its own.' 5
Furthermore, it is unlikely that potential antitrust violators will alter
their conduct on the basis of the chance that a lawsuit will be dis-
missed on forum non conveniens grounds.
The second purpose of the treble damage provision is to encourage
private actions, 56 which aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Dismissal in favor of a foreign forum may discourage plaintiffs from
continuing with the action. The plaintiff's decision, however, is inde-
pendent of the court's decision to dismiss on the basis of the relative
weakness of American interest in the action. Thus, congressional in-
tent manifested by the treble damage provision is not frustrated by
forum non conveniens dismissal, when, by definition, another forum
has a greater interest in the action. 57
C. What Alternative Forums Are Adequate?
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court defined an adequate alternative
forum as one in which the defendant is "amenable to process.' 58 In
addition, the Piper Court recognized that an alternative forum is
inadequate only when the remedy offered by that forum is "clearly
unsatisfactory."'5 9 While this standard is generally easy to meet, 16 0
antitrust cases pose unique problems.
152. When, however, a plaintiff brings an action to enjoin the defendant's con-
duct and, following dismissal, the foreign tribunal frames the injunction narrowly,
solely to protect its interests, then United States interests may require domestic
enforcement.
153. Grippando, supra note 17, at 415-20; see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
154. See Grippando, supra note 17, at 415-17. See supra note 142 and accompany-
ing text.
155. See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
156. "It is clear Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of
enforcement .... Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751
(1947); see 51 Cong. Rec. 16,274 (1914) (statement of Rep. Webb).
157. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). See supra notes
126-28 and accompanying text.
158. 330 U.S. at 507.
159. 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
160. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 225 (1st Cir. 1983); Needham
v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483-85 (10th Cir. 1983); Coastal
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A great number of antitrust violations of international scope con-
cern conduct in European markets.'16 Thus, the European Economic
Community (EEC) is of particular interest in providing adequate
alternative forums for actions sought to be dismissed from American
courts.
The EEC Treaty162 does not provide for private recovery of dam-
ages under Articles 85163 and 86164, the counterparts to sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. 65 National courts, however, "have a duty to
provide effective remedies . . . for loss due to any infringement of
Community Law."' 16 Pursuant to the urging of the EEC Commission,
the courts of some member nations, including France, England, Scot-
land, Ireland, West Germany, and Belgium, have provided private
damage remedies for violations of Articles 85 and 86.167 Thus, it can
Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203-04 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 349 (1983).
161. See Hawk, supra note 12, at 201; Shenefield, supra note 7, at 351-52. This is
logical since the majority of industrialized western nations are European. Consider-
ation should, however, be given to other parts of the world as well. For example, the
United States and Australia have signed a cooperation agreement that indicates the
importance of cooperation with respect to antitrust enforcement in the two countries.
Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprinted in 21 Int'l Legal Materials 702
(1982). See supra note 10.
162. Treaty Establishing the EEC, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
163. Id. at 47-48.
164. Id. at 48-49.
165. B. Hawk, supra note 7, at 430, 680.
Given the host of the United States statutes and enforcement bodies and
vehicles developed over almost a century, it is noteworthy that the far
simpler structure of the Common Market has managed in a comparatively
short length of time to bring about competition rules which are clearer and
more readily ascertainable to business and lawyers than is true in the United
States.
Id. at 427.
The best way for the United States to combat extraterritorial antitrust violations is
to subscribe to the EEC method of enforcement, either by joining with the EEC, or
by forming a like organization. An international method of policing what are largely
international violations is most likely to be effective, and least likely to be offensive to
individual states. This would leave the antitrust laws of the United States intact when
involved with a largely domestic problem.
166. Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States Courts-Claims
for Damages, Declarations and Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law
(unpublished manuscript) (to be published in 1983 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. -, (B.
Hawk ed. 1984)); see Mireco, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, 2574-75, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8694, at 8318-19.
167. Temple Lang, supra note 166, at _. "In ... Ireland, Scotland and En-
gland, an action can be brought for an injunction or damages ... for breach of
statutory duty," while in other member states the action is for "loss caused by an
unlawful act." Id. at -.
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hardly be said that in these nations the remedy provided is so "clearly
unsatisfactory"' 8 that they do not provide an adequate alternative
forum.
Furthermore, foreign statutes, such as the British "claw back" pro-
visions, "' enable defendants to recover the punitive portion of the
damages awarded in a United States action. 170 Therefore, the remedy
available in a foreign forum may be no less adequate than the one
obtained in an American court. 171 Moreover, the fact that the laws of
a foreign nation may be less favorable to the plaintiff should not in
itself be dispositive of a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss.
72
This consideration has been rejected by the Supreme Court, because a
plaintiff will usually bring suit in an available forum with the most
favorable law.' 73 Under such circumstances, forum non conveniens
dismissal would seldom be possible.
The Court in Piper suggested that dismissal is not appropriate
"where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject
matter of the dispute.'1 74 Forum non conveniens is therefore pre-
cluded only in actions in which the alternative forum does not provide
for private recovery of damages caused by anticompetitive conduct.
D. Expressions of Government Policy Militate in Favor of Use of
Forum Non Conveniens in Antitrust
Additional policy reasons militate in favor of the exercise of forum
non conveniens in antitrust cases. Antitrust actions place a particu-
larly heavy burden on American judicial resources because such
actions are by their nature complicated and time consuming. 75 This is
exacerbated by the fact that American courts are attractive to foreign
plaintiffs because of the availability of treble damages.
76
168. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
169. Protection of British Trading Interest Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6, reprinted in
[Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at F-2 (Apr. 10, 1980).
170. Section 6 provides in part: "(2)... the qualifying defendant shall be entitled
to recover from the party in whose favour the judgment was given so much of the
amount... as exceeds the part attributable to compensation." Id.
171. The deterrence and incentive goals of the treble-damage provision, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1982), are limited under these circumstances.
172. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248-50 (1981).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 254 n.22.
175. See United States v. National City Lines (National 1), 334 U.S. 573, 590
(1948); Becker, Expediting and Controlling Antitrust Litigation-The Demand for
Cost Containment, The Judge's Perspective, 51 Antitrust L.J. 437 (1982).
176. Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, observed that private antitrust plain-
tiffs are drawn to the United States "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light." Laker
Airvays v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 n.37 (D.D.C. 1983)
(quoting transcript of proceedings, Feb. 4, 1983, at 6).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the Justice Department rejects extraterritorial applica-
tion of antitrust laws in cases in which the foreign activities "have no
direct or intended effect on United States" consumers even when the
defendants are American.' 77 The Justice Department thus recognizes
both the duty of other nations to redress wrongs committed upon their
populace and the availability of such redress. 17 This is not only a
reaction to the international political dilemma that excessive extrater-
ritorial assertion of United States law creates. It is also a reaction to
the "proliferation of antitrust legislation in foreign nations,"'71 9 which
has weakened the traditional justification for extraterritorial enforce-
ment of antitrust laws.8 0
Recent legislation also indicates a trend away from rigid extraterri-
torial antitrust enforcement. In 1982, Congress amended the antitrust
laws to provide that the Sherman Act shall not apply to export trade
unless the conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect" on import trade, or other American export trade.' 8 ' More-
over, legislation proposed by the Department of Justice would limit
the availability of treble damages in antitrust actions, and would
thereby lessen the attractiveness of American courts.'82
Thus, it seems clear that even the traditionally rigid government
policy in favor of unimpeded enforcement of United States antitrust
laws has softened. This development invites the use of the forum non
conveniens doctrine as a viable tool in dispensing with antitrust
actions which may be better brought elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
Although not proposed as a panacea to the conflicts involving the
extraterritorial extension of United States antitrust laws, forum non
conveniens can be an effective way of disposing of some actions in an
efficient manner. Consideration of the full spectrum of interests-
national and international, public and private-is the most equitable
means of evaluating the viability of American adjudication of anti-
trust actions involving extraterritorial issues. Furthermore, the contin-
177. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 7 (1977).
178. Id.
179. Grippando, supra note 17, at 395 n.1; see, Hawk, supra note 12, at 207.
180. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
181. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982)).
182. See W. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate 7 (Dep't of Justice Press
Release June 29, 1983); W. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Remarks Before the Subcommittees on Investigations & Oversight & Science Re-
search & Technology of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives 6 (Dep't of Justice Press Release June 30, 1983).
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uing international development of antitrust laws helps guarantee both
redress to private plaintiffs and vindication of competition principles.
Mladen Don Kresic
